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CHAPTER IO
LOCKOUTS, PROTESTS, AND SCABS
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER STRIKE

'Bonnie 'Brennen
HE LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER STRIKE,

1967-

1977, offers important insights into the impact of insti-

tutional power on the development of labor and news
work in American journalism. The decade-long strike
had devastating economic consequences for both the
newspaper and the unions. According to Robert J. Danzig, Hearst
Corporation Vice President in the 1980s, although the unions and t he
newspaper finally reconciled, the strike "crippled labor relations and
caused an exodus of advertisers and subscribers" (quoted in Mathews
& Farhi 1989, E-3). As a result of the strike, t he Los Angeles Herald
Examiner eventually ceased publication and the viability of the Los
Angeles Newspaper Guild was severely undermined. Although the
"facts" of the labor conflict are well known, this essay addresses issues
of identity, work, and economics in the power struggle between Los
Angeles Newspaper Guild members and Hearst management. Specifically, this critical cultural study assesses the Guild-based publicity
efforts as well as the local and national press coverage of the strike
in an effort to understand the political and social implications of this
labor struggle. It also attempts to explain publisher George R. Hearst's
potential motives for refusing to negotiate with the unions and prolonging a strike that eventually destroyed his newspaper.
Critical communication studies offer historically grounded and politically informed examinations of culturally situated media practices
that may expose power relations in the communication process and
provide alternative readings of the relationship between media and
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society (H ardt 2001). Historically based critical cultural analyses go
beyond considerations of catastrophe, crisis, domination, and oppres~
sion to also consider regenerative processes, oppositional strategies,
and challenges to dominant ideological positions. As Raymond Wil~
Iiams (1989, 322) explains,"It's the infinite resilience, even deviousness,
with wh ich people have managed to persist in profoundly unfavorable
conditions, and the striking diversity of the beliefs in which they've
expressed their autonomy:' Understanding the political ramifications
of history, critical cultural assessments of labor relations consider the
"often t roubled" (Garnham 2000, 33) relationships between the cul~
rural and economic realms within organizations and professions.
During the past decade critical scholars h ave urged a more interdis ~
ciplinary approach to media studies, linking cultural considerations
directly to the political economic realm. The political economy of
communication examines relationships between media ownership,
advertising, and government policies, particularly as they influence
media practices and content (McChesney 2000). Showcasing theo~
retical connections between cultural studies and political economy,
Nicholas Garnham (1995, 7 1) maintains that because in capitalist
societies, "waged labor and commodity exchange constitute people's
necessary and unavoidable conditions of existence," these elements
must be included in any analysis of cultural pract ices. While cultural
studies theorists remain concerned with the reductionist potential of
political economy, Lawrence Grossberg (1995, 79) notes that econom~
ic practices may even help to shape the cultural agenda, albeit "always
and only in part:' Eileen Meehan (1999, 162) suggests that a dialogue
between cultural studies and political economy is "essential" to critique
the complex "relationships among corporations, audiences, makers,
and regulators:·
Pointing to Hanna H ardt's 1990 study of newsworkers, technology,
and journalism history as an example, Mosco (1996) finds that recent
studies of newsroom labor are one contemporary area of research that
attempts to reconcile political economic concerns wi th critical cultural
studies. This essay responds to Meehan's interdisciplinary call by in ~
regrating central concerns of political economy into a critical cultural
analysis.
This historical study of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner strike
draws on government documents on antitrust and monopoly, as well
as hearings regarding the Failing Newspaper Act, which considered
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joint operating agreements including "price fixing, profit pooling and
market allocation" (Barwis 1989, 27) for at risk newspapers. It uses
strike#related materials from the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild col,
lection at the Los Angeles Urban Archives Center; Los Angeles Herald
Examiner labor conflict files from the Freedom of Information Center
at the Missouri School of Journalism; and two telephone interviews
with Charles Dale, an International Representative of the N ewspaper
Guild who served as co#director of the strike.
CONSTRUCTING A COL LECTIVE IDENTITY

The strike began on December 15, 1967 when approximately 1,100
members of the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local69 walked out
of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. At the time of the labor conflict,
t he Guild negotiated for all Herald Examiner newsroom, circulation,
and business employees ("Guild strike idles 1900" 1967). Guild mem,
hers had asked for a $25.20 a week salary increase for reporters, pho,
tographers, and copy editors, achieved over a two,year period, to bring
them in line with their colleagues on the Los Angeles Times and the
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram. At the time of the strike, full
time professional Guild reporters, known as journeymen, with four
to five years experience earned a minimum of $174.50 a week at the
Herald Examiner. Comparable wages on the city's non,union morning
newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, were $208 a week ("Where do we
stand" 1967). Negotiations had broken down after Herald Examiner
management had offered Guild members a $13 weekly increase over a
two-year period (Stone 1968).
In support of the Guild, members of the International Association
of Machinists, Local 94 also walked out of the Herald Examiner that
morning. That afternoon members of the International Typographical
Unions, Printers Local 174 and Mailers Local 9 were locked out by
management after they refused to do editorial work such as gathering
wire copy and running stories from the news office to the back#shop
print facilities. Later that day Web Pressmen, Locall8, Stereotypers,
Local 58, and Paper Handlers, Local 3 were forced out of the newspa,
per"under threat of arrest" ("Strike fact sheet" 1968, 1). In sympathy,
Building Services Employees, Local 399, Teamsters General Ware,
housemen, Local 598, Photoengravers, Local262, and News Vendors,
Local 75,A stopped working. In total approximately 2,000 union
members were affected by the labor conflict.

210

..A ..Moment of"Danger

A few months before the strike began, the Los Angeles Newspa~
per Guild Bulletin evaluated minimum weekly pay rates for news~
paper reporters and photographers in urban newsgathering centers
guaranteed in Guild contracts. It found that Guild reporters in Los
Angeles received the lowest contract pay. For example, experienced
Guild reporters in St. Louis and San Francisco earned at least $200 a
week while Herald Examiner and Independent Press-Telegram reporters
earned $174.50 each week ("Where do we stand" 1967).1hat fall, the
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram Guild unit successfully negotiated a new contract that would bring reporters' salaries up to $200 a
week within two years.
In negotiating sessions held before the strike, Herald Examiner man~
agement maintained that it was "economically impossible" to match the
salaries and benefits of those recently negotiated at the other Guild
newspaper, the Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram. In response,
Robert). Rupert (1967), Chief Negotiator of the Los Angeles News~
paper Guild, urged Hearst to provide the Guild with evidence th at
the Herald Examiner was losing money. Hearst management did not
respond. In the early weeks of the strike, Hearst negotiators changed
their position regarding the salary dispute and said that while the
newspaper could afford the new wage proposals, they "did not see fit to
do so" ("No heart in Hearst position" 1968, 1).
Throughout the decade~long labor conflict, the Los Angeles News·
paper Guild organized a variety of public relations activities and uti~
lized several publication venues to keep strikers informed and to pub~
licize and promote their views on the progress of the strike. More th an
1,400 daily editions of the newsletter On the Line reported on labor
activities during the first four years of the Herald Examiner strike. The
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Bulletin regularly covered strike~ relat~
ed issues and events as did the official publication of the Los Angeles
County AFL~CIO unions, the Los Angeles Citizen. In addition, signifi~
cant labor related news and opinion were announced in press releases
sent to local, regional, and national media outlets throughout the ten
years.
Strike~related promotional activities and news coverage focused on
three major intertwined issues: the economic aspects of the strike, the
use of professional strikebreakers to crush the unions, and H earst's
refusal to negotiate with labor. Consistent with Douglas Kellner's
(1995) suggestion that in modernity group or individual identity is
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self~reflexive and changeable, Guild strike strategies may be seen to

have also aided in the development of a collective identity as workers.
One economics~based strategy of the Guild was to try to persuade
local companies to stop advertising in the Herald Examiner during
.the labor conflict. Letters were sent to major advertisers and mem~
bers talked with businesses about canceling their advertising. Rupert
(1968) maintained that advertisers held the key to the strike: "They
are the life line of the newspaper. Without them, Hearst could not
fur ther pursue his union~busting campaign." Urging major advertisers
to support the labor boycott, Rupert rejected the use of violence or
other illegal actions by union members, yet he warned that the Guild
would take every legal action possible to disrupt businesses that failed
to support the strike.
More than three years into the strike the Guild continued to encour~
age businesses not to buy advertising during the strike and consumers
not to purchase products from companies that continued to advertise
in the Herald Examiner. For example, the January 27, 1970 issue of
the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Bulletin urged workers not to buy
Coors, Seagrams, or California grapes because the companies still ad~
vertised in the Herald Examiner. In an effort to sway major advertised
continued support of t he newspaper, Guild members picketed H erald
Examiner advertisers a nd held large d emonstrations at major local re~
railers. While many businesses continued to advertise in the Herald
Examiner, demonstrations and related activities continued to increase
public awareness of th e strike and helped to bring Guild members to~
gether and re~energize them for the extended strike.
In addition to daily picket lines at the Herald Examiner, Guild crews
went door to door, discussing the strike with residents and asking
them to cancel their subscriptions to the Herald Examiner during the
dispute. This strategy n ot only hurt the newspaper's circulation but it
also further increased community awareness of the issues involved in
the strike. Decreases in circulation and advertising lineage reductions
were regularly reported in pro~Guild publications as evidence of la~
bor's progress in the strike. Hearst's discontinuation of the newspaper
bowling tournament and the closing of the Herald Examiner library
were showcased as further evidence of the strike's economic damage to
the newspaper (Dale and Pattison, n.d.).
Such strategies had devastating consequences for the Herald Ex~
aminer's circulation and revenue figures. Audit Bureau figu res for
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September 30, 1967 ranked the Los Angeles Herald Examiner as the
largest circulation daily afternoon newspaper in the United States,
with a Monday through Friday average of731,473 ("Guild strike idles
1900" 1967). Six weeks into the strike, Herald Examiner daily circula~
tion dropped 28 percent to about 450,000. Circulation continued to
decrease throughout the strike ("No apparent end seen" 1968). Ad~
vertising revenue declined sharply and Time magazine estimated that
after one year the strike had cost the Herald Examiner $15 million in
advertising sales revenues alone ("Defeat of the strikers" 1968).
Charles Dale, an International Representative of the Newspaper
Guild, was sent by labor leaders to Los Angeles to work with the other
unions on the strike. As co~director of the Herald Examiner strike,
Dale focused on making strike related activities as effective as pos~
sible. He oversaw the economic aspects of the conHict, made sure that
strike benefits were paid and all money was spent wisely, and worked
to bring the strike to a positive conclusion. According to Dale, to keep
strikers motivated during the lengthy conHict, the Guild held many
meetings and organized numerous events for the striking workers, in~
eluding an annual Thanksgiving food drive. As the strike dragged on
Guild members became discouraged. Nonetheless, Dale said, t he low
pay and old, outdated equipment at the newspaper motivated union
members. Most remained determined to negotiate a fair contract
(Dale 2002, pers. comm., February 21 and 26).
Appeals for donations to help fund the strike frequently appeared
in pro~labor publications. In March 1969, fifteen labor organizations
in Southern California pledged $250,000 for a radio, newspaper, and
television advertising campaign to encourage the public to boycott
companies who continued to advertise in the Herald Examiner (Joint
Council ofTeamsters 1969). Although unions throughout the coun~
try and in Canada helped out financially, by August 1971 the Los An~
geles Newspaper Guild had borrowed $100,000 from the AFL~CIO
because costs associated with the Herald Examiner strike had reached
five million dollars.
SHOWCASING SCAB LABOR

The most strident rhetoric found in Guild strike materials focused on
the Herald Examiner's use of professional strikebreakers, also known
as scabs. Author Jack London coined the term "scab" in 1903 to de~
scribe a professional strikebreaker who readily works in the place of
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a striking employee and refuses to join or support the actions of la~
bor. London (1953, 1) insisted that "the modern strikebreaker sells
his birthright, his country, his wife, children and his fellowmen, for an
unfilled promise from his employer, trust or corporation:· From ala~
bor perspective, the use of professional strikebreakers undermines the
coLlective bargaining process, since when scab labor is used, employers
are trying to "bust" the unions, reject contract negotiations, and op~
erate an open shop without union influence. During the Los Angeles
Herald Examiner strike, Hearst used at least 200 professional strike~
breakers "imported" from other cities and states. The Guild judged
this a betrayal of all working people and condemned it as unethical
and amoral. The Guild Bulletin and On the Line frequently referred to
professional strikebreakers as "parasites;"'criminals;' and "mercenaries"
with no redeeming value. Specific information on professional strike~
breakers working for the Herald Examiner was repeatedly included
in pro~Guild publications. For example, the January 1968 edition of
Strike Lockout Extra prominently displayed photographs of strike~
breakers and identified them not only by skill areas but also by name,
background, criminal record, and past strikebreaking activities.
Twelve days into the strike, AFL~CIO Leader Thomas L. Pitts
charged that Hearst's use of professional strikebreakers was part of
a concerted effort to destroy collective bargaining at the Herald Ex,
aminer and ultimately "crush the unions" (Peevey 1967). An undated
editorial cartoon in The Guild Bulletin by "Strobel" titled "A Killer on
the Loose!" illustrated labor's concern about "George R. Hearst's Anti~
Union Drive;' with huge feet smashing free collective bargaining in
America, and destroying employees' rights, union shops, decent wages,
working conditions, and the gains of labor during the last 30 years.
Strike leaders also maintained that professional strikebreakers
were used to destabilize the working class community of Los Angeles
("Dynamics of aggression" 1968). With nearly 2,000 employees out of
work, the economic and social well being of the community was chal~
lenged by "transient mercenaries" who collected excessive wages and
then moved on without contributing anything to the community. La~
bor leaders maintained that professional strikebreakers' lack of respect
for union work generally escalated into a total lack of respect for the
community as a whole ("Community is loser" 1968, 4 ).
Executive Secretary of the Los Angeles County Federation of La~
bor Sigmund Arywitz (1968a) maintained that Hearst management
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had been preparing for a strike for at least one month before it began.
Newsprint, cots, and food were stockpiled at the plant, a chain link
wire fence was installed around part of the building, and arrangements
were made with the Western Newspaper Industrial Relations Bureau,
a company chat specialized in providing newspapers with non~union
labor, to hire professional strikebreakers. Three weeks into the strike,
H earst negotiators announced that professional strikebreakers hired
at the beginning of the strike would become permanent employees and
would have "super-seniority" over striking workers regardless of any
final agreement reached. Finding Hearst's actions "wholly unaccept ~
able, immoral and a deterrent to peace" ("Labor calls Hearst boycott"
1968, A~3), Arywitz (1968b) insisted that such decisions made nego~
tiations impossible. He said that until the Herald Examiner dismissed
all professional strikebreakers and began negotiating with the unions,
they must be considered the enemy of labor. In response to Hearst's
actions, 2,000 union members participated in an anri~srrikebreaker
march from the Herald Examiner to Los Angeles City Hall ("Labor
socks Hearse;' 1968). The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor
called for a nationwide boycott of all Hearst enterprises. People were
urged not to purchase any Hearst newspapers, magazines, or Avon
Pocket Books and to cancel subscriptions to Hearst publications.
Hearst's unwillingness to negotiate continued throughout the
strike. Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorcy, members of the Los Angeles
City Council, and ten prominent Jewish and Protestant clergy urged
Hearst to negotiate with the unions; however, he refused ("Strike fact
sheer;' 1968). Eight months into the strike~lockout, Guild negotiators
said they were willing to work with any arbitrator chosen by the Herald Examiner. Hearst management replied:
We will not turn the management of this paper over to an outsider.
We are not going co give any outsider the authority co make decisions regarding the operation of this paper. We will not agree co
arbitrate any of the outstanding issues we have in dispute with rhe
Guild. (Rupert & Dale 1968, 1)
Nearly four years into the strike, the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild
and the other unions involved in the Herald Examiner srrike~lockour
volunteered to comply with President Richard Nixon's call for a three~
month end to all labor conflicts. In exchange for ending the strike,
union members asked Hearst to end his lockout and immediately
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rehire all union members who were still available to work. Hearst re,
fused to agree with their terms (Abraham 1971). Although Hearst's
unwillingness to deal with the unions frustrated negotiators, it rein,
forced the union's zeal for gaining an equitable contract and helped to
keep strikers motivated as to the righteousness of their cause, again
reinforcing a collective identity among Guild members as part of the
labor movement.
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE STRIKE

Over the ten years, an extensive amount of pro,Guild strike informa,
cion and publicity was produced. However, Dale explained that the
anti,labor sentiment in Los Angeles made getting other newspapers
interested in covering the Herald Examiner strike difficult (Dale 2002,
pers. comm.). Dale's comments regarding an anti,labor environment
are supported by research into the American labor movement during
the twentieth century. Robert McChesney (1999, 298) finds that in
mainstream media Labor coverage is limited to stories about the nega,
tive or violent aspects of strikes. "If one read only the commercial me,
dia, it would be difficult to determine what on earth good was served
by h aving labor unions at all:' As early as the 1940s and 1950s"union,
ists charged that it was impossible to find unbiased coverage of labor
issues in the daily press" (Fones,Wolf & Fones, Wolf 1995, 48). An as,
sessment of more than 50 articles on the Los Angeles Herald Examiner
strike published in local and national newspapers, collected in the Los
Angeles Urban Archives and the Freedom of Information Center, also
supports Dale's charges. From the 1950s through the 1990s the Mis,
souri Freedom of Information Center clipped all newspaper articles
available on freedom of expression, including the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner strike. A pro,labor perspective is virtually absent from the
reportage of the Herald Examiner strike. Consistent with McChesney,
the strike coverage in local and national newspapers, Time newsmaga,
zine, and the trade publication Editor and Publisher, focused on the
violence of the strike and the damage the unions were inflicting on the
newspaper.
In most cases a pro-management perspective was framed through
word choice and an emphasis on negative consequences of the strike
for H earst management. Headlines such as "Mob invades Walnut
Creek, attacks Times" (1968), "Strike violence at L.A. paper" (1968),
and "H erald strike throng pays city hall visit" (Bernstein 1968a)
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illustrate how the strikers' actions were cast in a negative light. The
coverage frequently compared the strikers to an unruly mob. For example, supporters of the strike were referred to as a "massive throng"
of demonstrators who "demanded" an audience with the Mayor (Bernstein 1968a, 1). When labor picketed other Hearst properties the Los
Angeles Times reported that picketers were participating in an "illegal
secondary boycott" (Bernstein 1968b, 1). In contrast, Hearst was portrayed as a courageous individual battling with the evil unions. Time
magazine maintained that the grandson of William Randolph dis played "determination rarely displayed these days by a publisher confronted with a strike" (" Frustrating the unions" 1968, 72). The Wall
Street Journal showcased Hearst's ability to keep publishing the news paper during the strike and several newspaper articles lauded Hearst
for working in the newsroom and pressroom, answering the phone
and even composing type. "Powerful" support from the non-union Los
Angeles Times and Mayor Yorty was showcased to illustrate the righteousness of Hearst's stance. Yorry was quoted as saying, "I think the
unions should get wise to themselves. They're putting the newspapers
out of business" (" Defeat of the strikers" 1968, 48). Financial costs
associated with the strike were used to reinforce the need to fight the
unions; no articles mentioned the circulation and advertising losses to
illustrate public support of strikers.
The consequences ofprofessional strikebreakers were downplayed in
most of the coverage. The term "professional strikebreaker" was rarely
used; instead scabs were referred to as "non-union personnel." To deemphasize the use of professional strikebreakers, reporters explained
how H earst managers worked in the newsroom to augment the use of
wire-se rvice copy and syndicated columns from other H earst writers.
T ime magazine reported that during the strike jurisdictional disputes
ceased, because non-union labor and management worked together
wherever they were needed. The article noted approvingly chat "even
reporters are called on to run copy and dirty their hands in the backshop" ("Frustrating the unions" 1968, 72).
Violence was a significant aspect of the strike coverage in the press.
During the strike Hearst management was quick to define any issues
or problems as violent pro-labor actions. The Herald Examiner distributed flyers and ran display advertisements offering a reward for evidence resulting in the arrest and conviction "of any person, or persons,
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damaging the property of any Herald,Examiner advertiser through
strike, related criminal activity" ("H earst reward" 1970).
Newspapers showcased Hearst's accusations in strike,related cover,
age, even when the charges were unfounded. Ten days after the strike
began the Los Angeles Thnes reported chat the Herald Examiner was
offering a $5,000 reward for information on shots fired at a newspaper
delivery truck. The Times quoted Herald management as saying that
since the strike began there had been repeated incidents and threats
of violence against newspaper dealers and carrier boys and sabotage at
the newspaper's offices. While the front,page article focused on strike,
related violence, it mentioned that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
office had found no bullet holes or other evidence to indicate a shoot,
ing (Reich 1967). Also within days of the strike's onset, Editor and
Publisher reported that union members had sabotaged the Herald Ex,
aminer. Hearst management had ch arged that glue was poured onto
the newsprint conveyor belts, ink tanks were emptied onto the press,
room floor, and composing room type and materials were destroyed
("Guild strike idles 1900;' 1967). Similarly, Time magazine described
the"cold blooded murder" of a non,union printer as the worst of some
150 strike,related violent actions. While the newsmagazine admitted
that police h ad not tied the crime to the unions, the article showcased
Herald Examiner opinion that blamed t he shooting on the strikers
(" Frustrating the unions;' 1968, p. 72). Ultimately, no charges were
ever filed against any union members connected with the Herald Ex,
aminer strike.
Lack of eviden ce was also apparent in the Des Moines Register report
that a January 1968 pro,labor demonstration "erupted into violence"
when windows were broken with rocks and sticks. The newspaper ar,
tide added that a television cameraman was "attacked" but sustained
no injury. Missing from the news story was any estimation of the num,
hers of protestors, the extent of the violence, or the cost of the dam,
age. Nor did the a rticle include any sources to support the accusations
("Strike violence at L.A. paper" 1968, 1). No follow,up coverage of the
demonstration was fou nd in the archived articles.
Reporters connected other arguably unconnected newspaper indus,
try violence to the Los Angeles Herald Examin er strike. For example,
when a Large group of men damaged machinery at the Walnut Creek
printing plant used to publish the Contra Costa Times and the Concord
Transcript, news reports blamed union sympathizers for the damage.
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Although no evidence was included to support such an accusation, articles quoted owner/ publisher Dean Lesher as saying that he did not
know why union sympathizers harmed his plant because his newspapers had "no connection" with strike. Lesher noted char the Herald
Examiner had hired some of his employees, bur he maintained that
the workers left"without consent" ("Printing shop wrecked" 1968, 8).
While much of the coverage included some mention of the union
perspective, if only ro counter Hearst's charges, some Editor and Publisher articles were openly and blatantly anti-labor. For example, an E
& P article published one month after the strike began emphasized
the efforts of labor to try to close down Hearst's newspapers. Calling
picket lines at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner and at H earst-owned
newspaper the San Francisco Examiner "strong-arm" techniques that
"turn collective bargaining into a farce" (Brown 1968, 64), E & Purged
Guild members to be reasonable and equitable. No mention whatsoever of the Guild's position appeared in the E & P article. Hearst's
use of professional strikebreakers and his unwillingness to participate
in collective bargaining were omitted from rhe coverage as were wage
inequities.
Overall, the U.S. press showcased a pro-management perspective on
the strike, dismissing union charges and accusations as insignificant.
None of the news articles presented both sides of the labor conflict
fairly, much less showcased a pro-labor position. Even labor's charge
that Hearst would not negotiate was downplayed and challenged as
merely a "claim" by union members ("Frustrating the unions" 1968,
72). None of the articles archived at Missouri questioned Hearst's
determination that union members were responsible for all strikerelated violence. No articles considered the possibility that police and/
or professional strikebreakers might be involved in some of the violence. In fact, Dale said that he met often with the Los Angeles Police
Department to complain about brutality on the picket lines, but he
found police were clearly pro-management (Dale 2002, pers. comm.).
In at least one case, a police officer framed a strike leader for destroying newspaper delivery boxes and threw him in jail for ten days. Dale
noted that the professional strikebreakers often assaulted the strikers. The strikebreakers walked through rhe picket lines with long neck
soda bottles and hit the picketers with them. They also injured strikers
with filed down printing tools.
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HEARST S UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE

Why did George Hearst refuse to negotiate with the unions and allow
the strike eventually to destroy his newspaper~ A definitive answer is
impossible, given that Hearst himself has remained mute on this topic.
He never commented publicly on the strike and repeated requests for
an interview have been denied. 1 No Herald Examiner archive exists.
As California Business reporter Dan Goodgame (1987, 46) suggest,
ed, as a private corporation, "the Hearses don't have to tell anybody
anything about their business, and generally they don't:' The Hearst
corporate web site offers a brief history of the corporation and a time,
line that begins on March 4, 1887 when William Randolph Hearst
became proprietor of the San Francisco Examiner. Although the vast
majority of acquisitions are included here, the site never mentions the
Los Angeles Herald Examiner (or any ocher Hearst,owned Los Ange,
les papers), although at one time it was the largest circulation after,
noon newspaper in the United States.
While the Hearst corporation may have erased the Herald Examiner
from its h istory, some strong evidence remains that provides clues as
to Hearst's motivation for his actions during the strike. Early in his ca,
reer William Randolph Hearst was not actively opposed to the labor
movement. Ironically, the Los Angeles Examiner began publication in
1903 after labor activists encouraged Hearst to start a union newspa,
per in Los Angeles to compete with the non,tmion Los Angeles Times
(North 2003). Hearst agreed and in November 1903 th e Los Angeles
Herald Examiner began publication.
Initially, Hearst seemed to respect the role of labor and he negoti,
ated equitable contracts with craft and trade unions. However, Hearst
was actively opposed to the American Newspaper Guild from its in,
ception in 1933. Envisioning reporters as romantic figures, Hearst felt
that the Guild would undermine editorial policies and could ultimate,
ly compromise the integrity of journalism (Lee 1937). He ordered
his editors and publishers actively to oppose the Guild. Newsroom
employees were warned not co join the Guild; those who disobeyed
were reprimanded and even fired (Carlisle 1969). In 1934, the firing
1

This author made numerous attempts by letter, email and telephone to
contact George H earst or any H earst managers willing to comment on the
Herald Examiner strike. To date, no one connected with the Hearst organi,
zation has been willing co comment.
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of the respected San Francisco Examiner editorial writer Louis Burgess
for union activities exemplified Hearst's anti,Guild policy. During the
development of the American Newspaper Guild, H earst refused to
negotiate with any of the local Guilds; when the Milwaukee News went
on strike, H earst vowed to spend as much money as necessary to de,
feat the Guild. After a tentative agreement had been reached between
editorial workers and the newspaper, H. L. Bitner, General Manager
of Hearst newspapers, informed Milwaukee Guild members, "The
H earst management will not enter into any agreement written or verbal that recognizes the Guild" (quoted in Leah 1970, 250). For H eywood Broun (1936), t he American Newspaper Guild's first president,
Hearst's strident non, recognition of the Guild became a unifying
force among editorial workers. Initially the Guild was organized as
a semi-professional organization that worked with publishers to rep,
resent the economic and professional needs of editorial workers. As
publisher resistance and non-recognition escalated, the Guild became
a union committed to collective bargaining. 2
George H earst's actions during the Herald Examiner strike solidified
an anti,Guild bias first established by his grandfather William Ran,
dolph H earst. During the twentieth century the Los Angeles News,
paper Guild and Hearst management had maintained a contentious
relationship. Strikes occurred in the late 1930s a nd again in 1946.
The Guild held a one,day strike in November 1965 after a contract
deadline passed without resolution. Apparently shocked by the strike,
George H earst settled with the Guild within hours but "vowed that
he would oust the unions" ("History of the Herald Examiner strike"
n.d.). The November 1965 strike is generally considered the precursor
of the 1967-1977 Herald Examiner strike. Dale suspects that Hearst
wanted to destroy the unions as a way to keep the Herald Examiner
economically competitive with the non,union Los Angeles Times (Dale
2002, pers. comm.). While this is an interesting explanation, it does
not fully explain Hearst's actions because at that time employees at
the Times were paid considerably higher wages than workers on the
Herald Examiner. Although the problems between the Hearst or,
ganization and the Guild were at least in part historically situated,
H earst's actions probably were also a conscious effort to weaken the
2 For further discussion on the development of a union perspective in the
American Newspaper Guild, see Brennen (2004).
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Guild specifically because it represented the most vocal opposition
to the development of monopolistic practices in the newspaper business. Over the years, the American Newspaper Guild repeatedly questioned the growth of newspaper chain ownership, single newspaper
communities, and local media monopolies. Concerned with the influence of newspaper concentration on the overall economic well-being
of communities, the Guild asserted that newspaper trends toward
monopolization eliminated the diversity of informacion, opinion, and
news sources that were essential to a democratic society (The Failing
Newspaper Act 1968a).
MEDIA CONGLOMERATION & MONOPOLIZATION

By the 1960s, single ownership or combination newspaper monopolies existed in most U.S. cities (Arywitz 1968a). In 1955 chains controlled about 28 percent of the daily newspapers in the U.S.; ten years
later they controlled 43 percent of daily newspapers (Failing Newspaper Act 1968a). In 1962 only 55 U.S. cities still had competing daily
newspapers, whereas 552 cities had competing daily newspapers in
1920. According to William Randolph H earst,Jr.,"when monopoly is
substituted for two formerly competitive papers, the profit is two and
a half times the total profit under independent operation of the two
papers" ("Growth of monopoly and concentrated ownership" 1963,
1291).
Interestingly, the creation of the Herald Examiner was the result of
a combination newspaper monopoly in Los Angeles. Until January
1962, four newspapers operated in Los Angeles. The Hearst-owned
Herald and the Chandler-owned Times were morning papers. Hearst's
Herald-Express and C handler's Mirror were afternoon newspapers.
Cross-ownership agreements arranged in 1962 between Hearst and
Chandler consolidated the Examiner and the Herald-Express and discontinued the Mirror. These actions resulted in one morning newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, and one afternoon paper, the Los Angeles

Herald Examiner.
During House of Representatives hearings on news media concentration of ownership, Hearst General Manager G.O. Markuson said
that the Hearst and Chandler actions in Los Angeles were undertaken
because the Los Angeles area "could not profitably support four metropolitan papers" (Failing Newspaper Act 1968a, 212). Markuson
maintained that some of the newspapers were consolidated because
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they were losing money. Yet in hearings before the judiciary subcom~
mittee of antitrust and monopoly, Executive Secretary of the New
York Newspaper Guild Thomas Murphy attributed the Los Angeles
situation to corporations creating a monopoly rather than encourag~
ing the "free flow of news as a competitive press" (Failing Newspaper
Act 1968b, 2677). Murphy noted that the Los Angeles newspapers
had been profitable before the consolidations. Doubting the claim
that newspapers were losing money, he said that for many years the
Los Angeles papers had been profitable but that profits had been
drained off to subsidize other corporate ventures. Further doubt
about Hearst's consolidations came from Samuel Shulman of the
General Accounting Office. In 1963, Shulman testified to a House an~
titrust subcommittee on newspaper business practices and ownership
trends that "more realistic bookkeeping" would have changed Hearst's
claimed $2,037,000 five~year loss on the Los Angeles Examiner into a
$6,124,000 profit (Failing Newspaper Act 1968a, 209).
In a concerted effort to halt the newspaper industry's trend toward
monopolization, in 1959 the Guild asked the Justice Department
to investigate possible antitrust violations in a rumored newspaper
merger between Scripps~ Howard and Hearst in New York City. In the
previous eighteen months Hearst and Scripps~ Howard newspapers in
San Francisco had merged and Scripps~Howard's United Press had
acquired Hearst's International News Service. The Guild noted that
before each of these business transactions, the newspapers had public~
ly denied plans for any merger. This time the Guild wanted the Justice
Department to consider potential antitrust violations before a merger
was completed. In response, H earst sued the American Newspaper
Guild for spreading unfounded rumors regarding a new Hearst and
Scripps~Howard merger. William]. Farson, Executive Vice President
of the Guild, said that the purpose of Hearst's lawsuit was to divert
public attention from the justice Department's recent scrutiny ofbusi~
ness transactions between H earst and Scripps~ Howard ("Comment
on Hearst suit"1959). The suit was eventually dropped but not be~
fore the Guild spent thousands of dollars in legal costs. However, the
Guild's call for an antitrust inquiry was successful in the short run in
that it forestalled new mergers between Hearst and Scripps~ Howard.
The American Newspaper Guild was also a vocal opponent of the
Failing Newspaper Act because it would accelerate the trend toward
monopolization and chain ownership of newspapers. The Failing
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Newspaper Act was originally designed to maintain the diversity of
editorial voices in a community when at least one newspaper was in se~
rious financial straits and no prospective buyer could be found. Under
the Act, newspapers established joint operating arrangements that al~
lowed them to "reduce costs by combining the economic and business
aspects of their papers' production, while at the same time maintain~
ing separate editorial and reportorial staff" (Barwis 1989, 28). Under
the Act, jointly operating newspapers may fix joint advertising rates
and pool their profits-actions that the Sherman and Clayton Anti~
trust Acts otherwise expressly prohibited.
At its board meetings and national conventions the Guild repeated~
ly raised opposition to the Failing Newspaper Act. State and national
officers also testified during Senate and House of Representatives
hearings. During Congressional hearings Thomas Murphy, Executive
Secretary of the New York Newspaper Guild, maintained that the
proposed bill violated current antitrust laws and infringed on freedom
of the press. Murphy said that, if passed, the Failing Newspaper Act:
would encourage greater monopoly, not only by giving existing pub ~
Ushers greater freedom to make agreements for producing newspa~
pers more cheaply through common production and distribution
facilities, but most importantly by giving the blessings of law to
unregulated price and rate fixing and profit~pooling arrangements
that make it financially impossible for a potential new competitor
to even consider attempting to enter a market. (Failing Newspaper
Act 1968b, 2674)

While other individuals and organizations also testified against the
Failing Newspaper Act, most of the commentary against the bill came
from Guild members. In contrast, newspaper owners and publishers
lobbied Congressional members for the Act and testified that the Act
would maintain a diversity of voices and actually prevent newspaper
monopolies. After extended hearings, and a series of legislative com~
promises, including a more optimistic sounding name, the Newspaper
Preservation Act became law on July 24, 1970. Just as the Guild had
warned, a retrospective assessment of the Newspaper Preservation
Act (Barwis 1989) found that joint operating agreements had saved
no newspapers from failure; instead it had increased the profits of sue~
cessful newspapers and encouraged monopolistic business practices
that inhibited freedom of the press.
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The Guild's vocal opposition to chain ownership and monopoliza~
tion and the Justice Department's repeated investigations into antitrust
violations directly targeted Hearst. Each time Guild members testified
before Congress, they offered examples from the Hearst Corporation
to support their concerns regarding monopolization and chain owner~
ship. With the lure of huge financial gains tempting Hearst, he may
have decided that his economic plans for the corporation depended
on destroying union viability. Certainly the issue of monopolization
at least partially influenced Hearst's decisions in the Herald Examiner
strike.
A STORY OF FAILURE

A critical assessment of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner strike show~
cases strategies of opposition, challenge, and resistance to the domi~
nant ideological power structure. It illustrates t he formation of a col~
lective identity as well as th e power struggles between the unions and
Hearst. However, the Herald Examiner strike is also a story of fail~
ure. Throughout the decade~long strike, Herald Examiner advertising
revenue and circulation dwindled. In the decade after the strike, the
newspaper was unable to rebuild its circulation and advertising base.
In 1989 when the Hearst Corporation attempted to find a buyer fo r
the newspaper, its circulation had fallen to 242,000. Unable to sell the
newspaper, the Herald Examiner ceased p ublication on November 2,
1989. Meanwhile, the viability of the Newspaper Guild and the other
unions involved in the labor conflict was severely undermined, because
they were unable to negotiate a settlement. In 1976 a series of elec~
tions decertified all of the original unions involved in the strike and
created a new union, the International Printing and Graphic Commu~
nications Union, which immediately began negotiations with Hearst.
Interestingly, the new union included striking workers who had not
found other jobs and non~union employees who currently worked for
the newspaper. Eight months later, in March 1977, the International
Printing and Graphic Communications Union successfully negotiated
a new three~year contract for Los Angeles H erald Examiner employees
("Union pack" 1977).
Although the Guild ultimately failed to bring the strike to a positive
outcome it does not diminish the years of effort and the resilience of its
campaign to raise wages for reporters on the Herald Examiner in line
with other Southern California newspapers. During the decade~l ong
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strike Guild members used a variety of promotional strategies to
showcase their struggle. Their sustained efforts informed the public
about the labor conflict and helped to influence adversely the Herald
Examiner's circulation numbers and advertising revenue. Although the
vast majority of the local and national newspaper coverage was pro~
management this stance had more to do with the newspapers' anti~
labor ideological position rather than any failing of the Guild to make
its views heard. Certainly Editor & Publisher's coverage of the strike
reinforced an anti~Guild position among editors and publishers that
began in the 1930s when the American Newspaper Guild first turned
to collective bargaining (Brennen 2004).
H earst refused to negotiate with labor despite sustained pressure
from community Leaders and the public to settle the strike. The con~
tinued losses of revenue and circulation were offset by his intention to
destroy union involvement at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. The
same strategy used by Hearst and other corporations to hide profits
from individual newspapers, by funneling income from one company
within the corporation to another, was used to sustain the Herald
Examiner during the decade~long strike. The assets of Hearst's multi~
million dollar media empire allowed the newspaper's continued losses
to be diffused throughout the corporation, Hearst was thereby able to
hold out for ten years until the existing unions had been decertified
and rendered powerless. Hearst's refusal to negotiate with labor was
repeated by othe r media conglomerates. Today union influence is at an
all time low in the newspaper industry.
As Hardt (1993, 90) suggests, the "anti~labor attitudes of media
owners may offer explanations for the contemporary status and work~
ing habits of newsworkers, the production of content matter, and the
understanding of audiences as consumers." At the time of the Herald
Examiner strike, while many newspapers were anti~ labor, they also
covered labor issues as a regular beat. Some newspapers, such as the
Los Angeles Times, employed a labor editor. Today, even on daily urban
newspapers, labor is no longer a regular area of coverage. McChesney
describes labor reporting as "nearly extinct" (2004, 88). Linking the
lack of labor coverage directly to th e decline of the labor movement,
McChesney notes, "People still work, poverty among workers is grow~
ing, workplace conflicts are as important as ever, but labor issues are
no longer considered newsworthy because organized labor is no longer
powerful" (2004, 76). Current labor coverage is routinely a historical,
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fragmented, and superficial because it lacks background or under,
standing of the role of labor.
The relationship between the strike and the Guild's active and sus,
rained opposition to monopolization also provides insights for future
research into conglomeration and consolidation, central concerns of
political economy. In the twenty,first century, the structure and con,
trol of media conglomerates are central concerns of a global market
economy. Ben Bagdikian notes that as of 2003, five media corpora,
tions-Tiine Warner, Walt Disney Company, Murdoch's News Cor,
poration, Viacom, and Bertelsmann-dominate mass communication
in the United States. Linking media conglomeration to an increasingly
limited flow of diverse information as well as to changes in public
policy and political power, Bagdikian (2004, 29) suggests that political leaders now "treat the country's most powerful media corporations
with something approaching reverence:' Yet, for many policy makers,
media monopolization is a new issue, because they do not understand
chat media consolidation has been a concern throughout the twentieth
century (Sterling 2000). At a time when the FCC is working to relax
media ownership rules even further, understanding the efforts of the
Newspaper Guild to alert Congress about the problems of monopoli,
zation might aid critics and researchers trying to counter questionable
FCC processes.
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